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ABSTRACT 
Winner Determination problem (WDP) in combinatorial auction is an NP-complete 
problem. The NP-complete problems are often solved by using heuristic methods 
and approximation algorithms. This paper presents an imperialist competitive 
algorithm (ICA) for solving winner determination problem. Combinatorial auction 
(CA) is an auction that auctioneer considers many goods for sale and the bidder bids 
on the bundle of items. In this type of auction, the goal is finding winning bids that 
maximize the auctioneer’s income under the constraint that each item can be 
allocated to at most one bidder. To demonstrate, the postulated algorithm is applied 
over various benchmark problems. The ICA offers competitive results and finds 
good-quality solution in compare to genetic algorithm (GA), Memetic algorithm 
(MA), Nash equilibrium search approach (NESA) and Tabu search. 
Keywords: Winner determination problem, Combinatorial auction, Imperialist 
competitive algorithm   
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The combinatorial auction is a type of auction that bidders can bid on 
combinations of items. Auction’s winners are given all items that bid. No item is 
given to those who don’t win.  Combinatorial auction allows bidders to bid for a 
bundle of goods (services and resources) and the valuation of the bundles depends 
on synergies between the individual goods, resources or services [1]. The 
combinatorial auction is expressed as follows: a set of m indivisible items that are 
simultaneously auctioned among n bidders [2]. In combinatorial auction, the goal is 
finding winning bids that maximize the auctioneer’s income under the constraint 
that each item can be allocated to at most one bidder. Determining winner in CA is a 
complex problem and can be formulated as an optimization problem which is NP-
complete [3, 4]. The combinatorial auctions are used in transportation, resource and 
task allocation in multi agent systems, cloud computing and communication network 
[2, 5-7]. 
Winner determination problem in CA is expressed as follows: the WDP consists 
of a set of m goods G={g1,g2,…,gm} and a set of n bids B={B1,B2,…,Bn}. Each bid 
Bj includes a tuple <Mj,Pj> where Mj is a set of items (Mj ⊆ G) and Pj is the price of 
Mj (Pj≥0 , Pjϵ Ʀ). Also consists a matrix Am×n where Aij=1 if the good gi is offered in 
Mj by bid Bj and Aij=0 if good Gi is not offered in Mj by bid Bj. The auctioneer’s 
objective is to calculate an assignment X={x1,x2,…,xn}, ∀xj ϵ {0,1} to determine 
winner. When xj=1 bid Bj is accepted (a winning bid) else (xj=0) this is a losing bid. 
The WDP can be formulated as an integer linear program: 
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Maximize ∑      
 
                                           (1) 
Subject to: ∑         ∀  {       }    {   }
 
     (2) 
 
Function (1) maximizes the auctioneer’s income which calculated as the sum of 
prices of the winning bids. Function (2) is the constraints that mean the item can be 
allocated to at most one bidder. 
 
 
2. RELATED WORK 
 
All works done for this problem is classified into three classes [2]: 
a) Approximation: the algorithms that find an approximately optimal allocation. 
The algorithms find winners quickly, but these algorithms don’t guarantee 
optimum solution for all problems. In paper [7], authors present a general 
technique based on maximal in range mechanisms that converts any α-
approximation non-truthful algorithm (α<1) for this problem into Ω(
 
     
) and 
Ω(α)-approximate truthful mechanisms. When agents have a general multi-
parameter function, social welfare in the oracle model is Ω(
√    
 
) [8]. In [9] is 
given Ω(
 
√ 
) -Approximate truthful mechanism for sub-additive valuation 
function. 
b) Special cases: focus on special cases that can be solved eﬃciently. In first 
case, bidder request a bundle of two items. The second case is the linear order 
case. In this case items are ordered in a linear order and each proper bundle is for 
an uninterrupted segment of items. Paper [10] reviews greedy mechanisms for 
truthful combinatorial auction in special cases which agents are interested in sets 
of size at most s. Also in the paper [11], the authors present a more sophisticated 
search algorithm in special case. 
c) Heuristics: A NP-completes are problems that we cannot write algorithms for 
them to run in polynomial time and obtain optimal outputs on all input instances. 
In this category, algorithms try to find optimal (or near optimal) answers in a 
reasonable time. Casanova [12] is a stochastic local search method proposed in 
paper [12]. In this paper Casanova is compared with the combinatorial auction 
structural search (CASS) [3] that is a branch-and-bound algorithm. The results 
show that Casanova is faster than CASS and also always find a better answer. In 
paper [13] is proposed a method based on hybrid simulated annealing (SAGII). 
SAGII includes an embedded branch-and-bound move. The SAGII is compared 
with the Casanova method and results show SAGII is better than Casanova. Paper 
[14] proposes four meta-heuristic (stochastic local search, Tabu search, genetic 
algorithm and memetic algorithm) for solving the winner determination problem. 
The results in this paper show that memetic algorithm provides competitive result 
and find a good-quality solution in comparison to other algorithms. But the 
runtime memetic algorithm is not better than other algorithms. Also, paper [15] 
proposes a different evolution algorithm and competitive with genetic algorithm 
and memetic algorithm. On paper [16] is proposed Nash equilibrium search 
approach (NESA) that is compared with genetic algorithm and results show that 
NESA is better. Also, the results show that the solution quality is near optimal. 
The well-known complete algorithms for the WDP are based on the branch-and-
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bound method. Paper [17] proposes the iterative deepening A*, the Branch-on-
items (BoI), the Branch on Bids (BoB) and the combinatorial auction BoB 
(CABoB) [17]. 
 
3. AN IMPERIALIST COMPETITIVE ALGORITHM FOR THE WDP 
 
The imperialist competitive (IC) is a computational algorithm that is utilized to 
solve optimization problem of different types [18]. The main basis of this algorithm 
is assimilation, imperialistic competition and revolution. 
 The ICA algorithm starts by generating a set of candidate random solutions in 
the search space of the optimization problem. The generated random points are 
called the initial Countries. Countries in this algorithm are the counterpart 
of chromosomes in GA and particles in Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) and it is 
an array of values of a candidate solution of optimization problems. The cost 
function of the optimization problem determines the power of each country. Based 
on their power, some of the best initial countries (the countries with the least cost 
function value) become Imperialists and start taking control of other countries 
(called colonies) and form the initial Empires [18]. 
In this section, an imperialist competitive algorithm is proposed to solve the 
winner determination problem. The main background of proposed algorithm is 
presented in the following subsections: 
 
3.1 COUNTRY REPRESENTATION 
 
For simulation of a country, a binary vector (A) having n genome is utilized 
where n is equal to the number of bids. The value of each component is 0 or 1. Here 
1 present accepted of bid and 0 present rejection of bid. 
 
3.2 THE INITIALIZATION OF THE COUNTRY 
 
We use the random key encoding (Rk) [19] for creating a new country. The 
random key operates as follows: we create n real number between 0 and 1 where n is 
the number of bids. Then, we select the bid having the maximum order value and 
add it in the current allocation. Then, we select the bid having the second-highest 
order value if it does not conflict with bids that are in the allocation. This process 
repeats until checking all of the bids. 
 
3.3 THE INITIALIZATION OF THE EMPIRES 
 
First, Ncountry initial countries are generated. Then, Nimp emperor is selected from 
the best countries. The other Ncol countries are assigned to the most similar emperor. 
 
3.4 REVOLUTION: SUDDEN CHANGE IN THE POSITION OF A 
COUNTRY 
 
In this section, a new empire is made and a colony randomly is selected. Then a 
genome is chosen and its value is inverted. (i.e. if the genome bit is 1, it is changed 
to 0). After that, the selected colony is added to the new empire. This is repeated for 
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a specific number of times. Also, the best country is selected for emperor of this 
empire. 
 
3.5 ASSIMILATION: COLONIES MOVE TOWARDS IMPERIALIST 
 
A new assimilation policy is proposed in the postulated policy. The number of 
emperor bits replaced with the colony bids and the conflict bids are removed (Figure 
1). 
This moves colony towards the emperor. Also, a stochastic local search algorithm 
(Algorithm 1) is used to improve the quality of emperors. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1. Assimilation operation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.6 THE STOCHASTIC LOCAL SEARCH METHOD 
 
Algorithm 2. The SLS method 
Require: a WDP formula, an allocation A, maxiter, wp 
Ensure: an improved allocation A 
1. For I=1 to maxiter do 
2. R=random number between 0 and 1 
3. If R<wp the 
4.       Bid=pick a random bid (*step 1) 
5. Else 
6.       Bid=pick a best bid (*step 2) 
7. End if 
8. A=A with picked bid included into it 
9. Remove from A any conflicting bid 
10. End for 
  Return the best allocation found 
Algorithm 1. The assimilation method 
Require: an allocation empires 
1. for i=1 to the size of empires do 
2.       For each colony A in emperor(i) 
3.               Move colony A toward emperor(i) 
4.       End for 
5.       Apply SLS on emperor(i) 
6. End for 
  Return the best allocation found 
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Algorithm 3. The imperialist competitive algorithm 
Require: a WDP formula, maxiter 
Ensure: an allocation of bids that maximize the auctioneer’s revenue 
1. Create the conflict graph 
2. Create an initial empires ica according to RK encoding 
3. While number of imperialist equal to 1 
4.       Revolution phase 
5.       Assimilation phase (algorithm 2) 
6.       Exchange phase 
7.       Eliminate phase 
8. End for 
Return the best country solution found 
To improve the quality of answers in the empire, we use a stochastic local search 
method [20]. The SLS method starts with a generated country A, then, it performs a 
certain number of local steps that consists of selecting a bid to be added in country A 
and removing all conflicting bids that can be occurred in the current allocation. The 
added bid is selected according to one of the two following ways:  
a) The first way (step1 of Algorithm1) is choosing the bid in a random way   with a 
fixed probability wp>0. 
b) The second way (step2) is choosing the best bid. 
The process that mentioned above is repeated. The maxiter is defined as a 
variable that  represents the number of iterations and it is fixed empirically. 
The SLS algorithm is sketched in Algorithm 2 [20]. 
 
3.7 POSITION EXCHANGE BETWEEN A COLONY AND EMPEROR 
 
A colony with a better position than the emperor has the chance to take the 
control of empire by replacing the existing imperialist. 
 
3.8 ELIIMINATE THE POWERLESS EMPIRES 
 
Gradually, the weak empires lose their power and they will finally be eliminated. 
 
3.9 THE ICA ALGORITHM FOR WDP 
 
The proposed ICA algorithm for the WDP is a simple imperialist competitive 
algorithm. Countries generated randomly according to the random key encoding. 
ICA starts with an initial empires (IE) which is randomly selected from countries. 
Then, it applies the revolution operation to construct a new empire. Also, it applies 
an assimilation operation to move colonies toward empires. Then it performs 
exchange operation to exchange position between a colony and an emperor. Finally, 
it applies elimination operation to eliminate the weak empires. The ICA process is 
repeated a finite number. This number is obtained by an empirical study. The overall 
ICA algorithm for the WDP is sketched in Algorithm 3. 
 
4. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS 
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This section gives some experiment results. The source code is written in Octave 
on a computer with core2 Duo 2.5 GHz and 3 Gb of RAM. 
We performed several experiments to evaluate the performance of the postulated 
algorithm on the WDP. The algorithm is compared with some other methods, 
including Tabu search [14], genetic algorithm (GA) [14], memetic algorithm [21] 
and equilibrium-based approach [16]. 
 
 
4.1 BENCHMARKS 
 
To measure the performance of algorithms on the WDP problem we use the 
combinatorial auction test suite (CATS) [22] to generate benchmarks. We generate 
50 instances for test. The instances can be divided into 5 different groups where each 
group contains 10 instances. If m is the number of goods and n is the number of 
bids, then the details of each group are given as follows: 
a) REL-1000-500: 10 instances from 101 to 110: m=500, n=1000. 
b) REL-1000-1000: 10 instances from 201 to 210: m=1000, n=1000. 
c) REL-500-1000: 10 instances from 301 to 310: m=500, n=1000. 
d) REL-1500-1000: 10 instances from 401 to 410: m=1000, n=1500. 
e) REL-1500-1500: 10 instances from 501 to 510: m=1500, n=1500. 
 
4.2 PARAMETERS TUNING 
 
We used an experimental study to determine the parameters of the ICA algorithm. 
The ICA parameters are the country size (Ncountry) and the size of the initial emperor 
(Nimp). The SLS search in the improvement phase of ICA, performs a number of 
iterations at each call to achieve the best result, equal to maxiter. The parameter wp 
is fixed empirically to 0.2 
 
 
FIGURE 2. The impact of the country and initial emperor parameters on the solution quality of 
method ICA 
 
  
Computer Engineering and Applications Vol. 4, No. 1, February 2015 
 
ISSN: 2252-4274 (Print)         25 
ISSN: 2252-5459 (Online) 
 
FIGURE 3. The impact of the country and initial emperor parameters on the CPU time of the ICA 
4.2.1 THE IMPACT OF THE SIZE OF THE COUNTRY AND INITIAL 
EMPEROR ON THE ICA PERFORMANCE 
 
We performed several experiments on the instances of the five different 
groups to show the impact of the size of the country and initial emperor. 
Figure 2 shows the impact of the country and initial emperor parameters on the 
solution quality of ICA. For each group of problems, the quality of the solution is 
improved when the country and initial emperor parameters increase. Figure 3 shows 
that the CPU time of ICA becomes larger when the parameters increase. 
 
4.2.2 THE IMPACT OF THE PARAMETERS ON ICA 
 
Table 1 shows the results found for ICA by applying five groups of instances. 
column sol presents average revenue and column time shows average CPU time of 
the algorithm in second. This table shows an overview of results with different value 
of parameters. We can see that by increasing the value of the parameters the solution 
quality is improved, but the CPU time for the ICA process is increasing. 
 
TABLE 1.  
The results of ICA on instances for different parameters. 
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4.3 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
We perform several experiments to evaluate the performance of ICA on the WDP 
by comparing over utilized state-of-arts methods. The parameters for other methods 
are: 
a) The Tabu search parameters: the maximum number of iterations (maxiter) is 
5000, the λ is equal to 40 and the parameter d is set to 10. 
b) The genetic algorithm parameters: max generation is set to 150, popsize is 
equal to 30, crossover rate is set to 0.8 and the mutation rate is set to 0.1. 
c) The memetic parameters: the size of collection C is fixed to (8,8), the size of 
generation is 100, maxiter is equal to 300 and wp is set to 0.3. 
 
4.3.1 A COMPARISON BETWEEN TABU, MEMETIC, GA, NESA AND 
ICA 
 
We can see that the results of Tabu, memetic, GA, NESA and ICA in tables 2 to 
6. In the tables, sol is the solution found by the algorithm and time is CPU time of 
the algorithm in second. 
 
 
TABLE 2. 
GA, Memetic, Tabu, NESA and ICA on some REL 500-1000 instances 
 
Instances  GA 
time          sol 
Memetic 
time             sol 
Tabu 
 time        sol 
NESA 
time           sol 
ICA 
time          sol 
In301 2.57 5916.18 86.69 6712.09 6.28 6712.09 16.79 5848.77 19.53 6712.09 
In302 9.73 930710 78.60 930710 6.08 930710 76.31 178001.17 20.85 930710 
In303 66.16 300240.4 107.54 358439.59 7.10 354902.92 498.82 307034.60 25.35 358425.87 
In304 29.54 2515.14 92.77 2707.68 7.22 2640.94 264.82 2624.21 24.76 2691.26 
In305 34.86 272490.67 92.04 348221.49 7.52 343619.91 245.98 264832.96 20.98 345893.69 
Test set ins Ncountry Nimp Maxiter Time sol 
REL 500-1000 10 10 5 300 4.1598 172003.10 
REL 1000-500 10 10 5 300 8.1593 121198.8 
REL 1000-1000 10 10 5 300 9.1342 208077.67 
REL 1500-1000 10 10 5 300 14.3393 211518.24 
REL 1500-1500 10 10 5 300 14.6269 287171.30 
       
REL 500-1000 10 20 8 60 6.7751 172908.38 
REL 1000-500 10 20 8 60 15.1648 122269.12 
REL 1000-1000 10 20 8 60 16.5704 208950.86 
REL 1500-1000 10 20 8 60 27.2228 213469.48 
REL1500-1500 10 20 8 60 27.7536 289634.85 
       
REL 500-1000 10 40 10 300 21.1246 173592.14 
REL 1000-500 10 40 10 300 39.1037 123129.76 
REL 1000-1000 10 40 10 300 45.7174 210858.21 
REL 1500-1000 10 40 10 300 67.9613 215717.91 
REL 1500-1000 10 40 10 300 64.7756 291600.82 
       
REL 500-1000 10 30 12 500 32.6712 173465.33 
REL 1000-500 10 30 12 500 58.9308 134734.65 
REL 1000-1000 10 30 12 500 58.4658 211262.15 
REL 1500-1000 10 30 12 500 91.5021 233062.31 
REL 1500-1000 10 30 12 500 88.5099 317529.71 
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In306 13.64 26576.04 83.67 30334.23 8.10 28606.19 109.52 25748.60 19.28 29096.06 
In307 12.93 25277.95 83.08 28204.62 8.24 26691.17 110.97 25314.95 17.08 28046.87 
In308 26.79 321.15 75.82 321.15 7.08 321.15 34.97 321.15 22.97 321.15 
In309 13.51 54.33 83.23 59.06 7.22 56.82 126.37 54.22 25.13 58.29 
In310 11.67 29661.06 80.53 35470 7.52 34744.81 133.36 29827.25 15.27 34966.13 
 
 
TABLE 3. 
GA, Memetic, Tabu, NESA and ICA on some REL 1000-500 instances 
Instances GA 
time          sol 
Memetic 
time             sol 
Tabu 
 time        sol 
NESA 
time           sol 
ICA 
time          sol 
In101 6.67 16892.71 155.96 18908.04 17.27 18908.04 30.03 18314.08 27.43 18832.1 
In102 12.68 472331.66 133.97 488882 14.01 488882 24.15 75155.59 39.06 488882 
In103 88.65 287894.74 178 359269.84 19.51 337548.52 593.64 288393.03 51.04 352396.75 
In104 26.82 2124.49 148.95 2469.83 16.81 2312.3 224.74 2302.20 41.06 2361.53 
In105 44.28 224920.30 153.99 302346.96 18.55 290608.52 274.21 228814.53 34.01 298918.2 
In106 13.54 18398.49 144.8 22731.15 17.9 20464.63 95.09 18247.12 41.43 21765.04 
In107 13.99 18780.93 147.27 22189.85 18.16 20953.8 106.79 18978.79 36.2 22066.02 
In108 36.24 451.24 139.17 477.81 17.15 460.57 127.73 451.5 43.69 475.9 
In109 19.01 67.50 141.93 72.19 16.02 69.46 134.44 67.31 31.53 71.01 
In110 14.26 20007.2 136.07 25865.21 16.83 25183.61 122.86 21583.96 45.54 25530.04 
 
 
TABLE 4. 
GA, Memetic, Tabu, NESA and ICA on some REL 1000-1000 instances 
Instances GA 
time          sol 
Memetic 
time             sol 
Tabu 
 time        sol 
NESA 
time           sol 
ICA 
time          sol 
In201 6.41 19100.48 154.75 20277.56 17 20277.56 36.8 19120.6 33.44 20277.56 
In202 33.37 952030 128.34 965723 12.58 965723 1831 726301.78 39.44 965723 
In203 135.6 421996.06 206.47 532577.38 20.36 504628.94 1702 433633.84 63.81 524950 
In204 44.8 3225.34 165.09 3753.44 17.66 3694.23 545.04 3593.35 58.1 3747.01 
In205 64.35 340127.66 167.54 483069.57 19.33 449419 639.28 358558.65 41.57 475163.04 
In206 19.78 33854.09 145.92 38184.07 18.03 37184.47 227.88 36872.99 44.12 38359.94 
In207 20.47 28648.47 146.31 34141.25 18.67 31766.1 218.57 29810.36 35.09 33789.44 
In208 53.32 586.66 135.22 598.92 18.41 590.84 135.38 586.32 48.16 597.80 
In209 23.09 74.41 144.73 85.43 16.27 80.51 248.91 78.44 45.91 83.61 
In210 18.73 36044.24 139.52 46944.75 16.83 46309.86 243.07 38142.29 47.49 45990.67 
 
 
TABLE 5. 
GA, Memetic, Tabu, NESA and ICA on some REL 1500-1000 instances 
Instances GA 
time          sol 
Memetic 
time             sol 
Tabu 
 time        sol 
NESA 
time           sol 
ICA 
time          sol 
in401 6.88 10999.09 222.2 12563.62 23.7 12563.62 36.39 10416.42 48.5 12240.55 
in402 18.88 920281.3 190.8 972951 23.4 972951 137.4 177141.8 56.5 972951 
in403 208 508356.4 316.3 660188.7 37.8 636119.5 2992 518298.4 101.1 653802.17 
in404 56.8 3603.04 245.42 4214.07 29.95 4051.75 884.48 3977.15 74.86 4076.68 
in405 102.92 398347.46 258.25 567193.03 34.57 556290.67 1407 418859.6 60.25 559704.69 
in406 28.54 37828.12 222.2 44107.94 30.57 41192.46 352.51 37340.61 67.92 43418.38 
in407 29.16 31431.18 222.71 37429.59 31.56 35782.32 549.83 31996.92 71.5 36726.97 
in408 76.49 1401.04 214.23 1438.39 31.43 1420.09 530.56 1401.1 81.72 1432.32 
in409 30.01 100.01 215.95 109.23 27.5 105.55 581.96 104.88 69.22 106.91 
in410 30.05 37131.41 210.39 48617.41 28.65 46358.71 826.61 40966.71 68.34 47446.71 
 
 
TABLE 6. 
GA, Memetic, Tabu, NESA and ICA on some REL 1500-1500 instances 
Instances GA 
time          sol 
Memetic 
time             sol 
Tabu 
 time        sol 
NESA 
time           sol 
ICA 
time          sol 
in501 5.45 6427.45 215.6 8159.5 21.6 8159.5 38.67 6529.83 28.1 8159.5 
in502 25.99 1453583 188 1486440 23.3 1486440 784.8 534453.2 53.1 1486440 
in503 259.6 607988.2 344.6 798177.1 38.3 788158.3 5538 630143.9 97.8 793414.8 
in504 80.1 4793.66 266.1 5529.08 32.2 5422.7 2345 5407.38 80.9 5349.34 
in505 117.7 495142.04 274.25 714650.73 35.54 673762.95 2581 526419.81 63.1 685191.77 
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in506 38.89 51965.42 224.56 60820.64 30.41 9960.65 768.1 51925.16 60.92 60777.02 
in507 33.27 43262.29 222.54 50679.66 31.34 49970.8 721.46 44062.03 42.37 50138.41 
in508 94.19 1187.32 212.37 1212.3    33 1201.14 468.12 1187.15 80.47 1206.93 
in509 31.68 100.4 112.42 216.59 27.56 111.28 698.39 104.29 64.83 109.14 
in510 35.31 56161.08 213.94 72484.29 28.58 69315.57 978.41 62072.23 72.37 70375.38 
 
The result of tables 2 to 6 shows that memetic algorithm, Tabu and ICA methods 
find a good-quality answer for all instances while, the GA and NESA usually fail to 
find a good-quality answer for all instances. We can see that the Tabu is the fast 
algorithm. Also, the memetic algorithm usually finds best answer, but the CPU time 
is high. The ICA algorithm usually finds a best second answer, but the CPU time is 
better than memetic algorithm. The ICA algorithm has a worse-quality response 
0.83%  than the memetic algorithm. But the ICA algorithm 71.2% are faster than 
algorithm algorithm. Also, The ICA algorithm has a better-quality response 1.17 %  
than tabu algorithm. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
We proposed an imperialist competitive algorithm (ICA) for the winner 
determination problem in combinatorial auction. We evaluated this method on the 
different instances of  problems, is compared to genetic algorithm (GA), memetic 
algorithm (MA), Tabu search and Nash equilibrium search (NESA). The results 
show that the ICA algorithm is competitive algorithm. Though cannot find best 
answer, but find a good-quality answer in modest time. 
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